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abstract
Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epi-
stemic justication with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation.
According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery
ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow
that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does
not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. I present two
objections to this solution. First, even if justication itself amounts to no more than
epistemic permissibility, the lottery paradox recurs at the level of doxastic obliga-
tions unless one adopts an extremely permissive view about suspension of belief
that is in tension with our practice of doxastic criticism. Second, even if there
are no obligations to believe lottery propositions, the permissibility solution fails
because epistemic permissions typically agglomerate, and the lottery case provides
no exception to this rule.
1. the lottery paradox and the permissibility solution
Thomas Kroedel has recently argued for a novel solution to Henry E. Kyburg’s famous
lottery paradox.1 On a common construal, the paradox occurs if we apply two plausible
assumptions about epistemic justication to the case of an agent A who knows that he is
confronted with a fair lottery with a large number of tickets, one and only one of which
will win. The rst assumption is that we have justication to believe what is very likely,
given our evidence:
The probability claim: If A’s evidence makes p exceedingly likely, then A has justication for
believing p.2
1 Kyburg (1961: 197), Kroedel (2012). Recent discussions of Kroedel’s permissibility solution include
Littlejohn (2012, 2013), Huber (2014), Eder (2015), as well as Kroedel (2013a, 2013b, 2017).
Neither of these contributions addresses the objections that I raise in this paper.
2 Three claricatory remarks on the relevant notions of ‘justication’ and ‘belief’: First, like Kroedel, I am
primarily concerned with epistemic justication. Except when I explicitly address other possible forms
of justication for doxastic states, I use ‘justication’ as short for ‘epistemic justication’. Second, like
Kroedel, I am concerned with what is sometimes called ‘propositional justication’ (in contrast to ‘dox-
astic justication’ which is concerned with the epistemic status of a particular belief token). Throughout
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Let us call a proposition of the form ‘lottery ticket number x will lose’ a lottery propos-
ition. Depending on the number of tickets involved in the lottery, the probability claim
entails that for each lottery proposition, A has justication to believe it. By varying the
number of tickets, we can generate this result for any degree of probability that we
deem sufcient for justication, as long as it is below 1.
The second assumption is that we have justication for believing a proposition if that
proposition is a conjunction of two other propositions each of which we have justication
to believe:
The conjunction claim: If A has justication for believing p, and A has justication for believing q,
then A has justication for believing p&q.3
The well-known problem is that these two initially plausible assumptions together entail
the paradoxical conclusion that A has justication for believing that all lottery tickets will
lose. To see this, let ‘J’ be the operator for justication, let ‘B’ be the operator for belief, let
‘lx’ be the proposition ‘lottery ticket number x will lose’, and let ‘n’ be the number of tick-
ets that the lottery contains. The argument can then be represented as follows:
(1) JBl1& . . . &JBln
(2) (JBp&JBq)JB(p&q)
(3) JB(l1& . . . &ln)
(1) states that for each lottery ticket, A has justication to believe that this ticket will lose,
which is entailed by the probability claim. Through iterated applications of the conjunc-
tion claim (2), we reach the conclusion (3) that A has justication to believe that all tickets
will lose. This conclusion is clearly false: we assumed that A knows that at least one ticket
will win; A thus cannot have justication for believing that all tickets will lose. Kyburg
concluded from this that justication is not as closely related to logic as it might have
seemed and rejected the conjunction claim (2).4 While some epistemologists have followed
him, others again resisted this conclusion and rejected the probability claim instead,
thereby escaping the paradox by denying (1).5
this paper, I use ‘A can justiably believe p’ and ‘A has justication for believing p’ equivalently in order
to refer to this kind of justication, where ‘having justication’ in this paper always means having suf-
cient justication, not merely having partial justication. Third, again like Kroedel, I am concerned only
with beliefs simpliciter, not with the quantitative notion of belief that allows for degrees. The lottery
paradox is often discussed in the context of what Foley (1992: 111) has dubbed the ‘Lockean
Thesis’, according to which the standards of justication for belief simpliciter can be derived from
the standards of justication for the degree of condence that amounts to belief simpliciter. Despite
what is sometimes asserted, however, the Lockean Thesis is not an essential premise of the lottery para-
dox, but only one possible motivation for the probability claim. It is perfectly consistent to deny the
assumption (entailed by the Lockean Thesis) that the ordinary notion of belief simpliciter can be
explained in terms of a quantitative notion of belief – as, for example, Skorupski (2010: 51) does –
while maintaining the probability claim with respect to belief simpliciter.
3 The conjunction claim also follows from the more general closure principle, according to which we have
justication for believing a proposition if it logically follows from other propositions each of which we
have justication to believe. I shall focus on the conjunction claim, however, since no stronger claim is
needed to generate the paradox.
4 See also Kyburg (1970).
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How does Kroedel’s permissibility solution relate to this dialectic? Although his own
presentation of the paradox conceals this fact, Kroedel actually sides with Kyburg in giv-
ing up the conjunction claim, as it is usually understood. In contrast to Kyburg, however,
Kroedel thinks that there is an alternative interpretation of the conjunction claim that can
be maintained in the light of the lottery paradox even if we hold on to the probability
claim. According to this alternative interpretation, the justication operator in the ante-
cedent of the conjunction claim takes wide scope over ‘believing p and believing q’:
The wide-scope conjunction claim: If A has justication for believing p and believing q, then A has
justication for believing p&q. [J(Bp&Bq)JB(p&q)]
If we replace (2) with this wide-scope version of the conjunction claim, the paradoxical
conclusion (3) does not follow anymore. This solution requires, however, that the follow-
ing principle is false:
Justication agglomeration: If A has justication for believing p, and A has justication for believ-
ing q, then A has justication for believing p and believing q. [(JBp&JBq)J(Bp&Bq)]
This is because the permissibility solution is supposed to preserve the probability claim
and its implication that for each lottery proposition, A has justication to believe it (1).
If justication agglomerates, however, it follows from (1) that A has justication for hav-
ing all lottery beliefs together and we can run the following argument to the paradoxical
conclusion:
(1)WS J(Bl1& . . . &Bln), from (1) by justication agglomeration
(2)WS J(Bp&Bq)JB(p&q), wide-scope conjunction claim
(3) JB(l1& . . . &ln)
Kroedel’s attempt to rescue a version of the conjunction claim while holding on to the
probability claim thus depends essentially on his rejection of justication agglomeration.
His argument is that since ‘justication is a species of permissibility’,6 and ‘permissibility
does not agglomerate’,7 justication likewise fails to agglomerate. If it works, his solution
would be a signicant achievement, since we could maintain the intuitive connection
between justication and probability while holding on to at least a version of the conjunc-
tion claim.8
5 See e.g. Foley (1979) and Klein (1985) for the rejection of the conjunction claim, and Ryan (1996) and
Nelkin (2000) for the rejection of the probability claim.
6 Kroedel (2012: 57). Note that Kroedel does not actually explicitly endorse the claim that justication is
a species of permissibility; strictly speaking, he argues only for the conditional claim that if justication
is a species of permissibility, then this provides a solution to the lottery paradox.
7 Kroedel (2012: 59).
8 Kroedel’s presentation of both the paradox and his solution differs from mine in some respects. In his
original article (Kroedel 2012), he does not even mention what I take to be the standard interpretation
of the conjunction claim (2), but simply assumes the wide-scope version (2)WS as the relevant claim at
issue. Disregarding (2), he then argues that the paradoxical conclusion follows only if the rst premise is
interpreted as the wide-scope claim (1)WS rather than the narrow-scope claim (1). Kroedel thus seems to
take the lottery paradox to consist in the fact that (1)WS and (2)WS entail (3), and his solution to consist
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In this article, I present and discuss two objections to the permissibility solution. The
rst objection grants Kroedel’s assumption that justication by itself amounts to no
more than an epistemic permission, but argues that it is nonetheless plausible to assume
that there are obligations to believe highly probable propositions under certain conditions
that a lottery case might satisfy. It follows that the lottery paradox recurs at the level of
such obligations (§2). The second objection is that the permissibility solution fails even
if there are no obligations to believe lottery propositions, because it requires that justica-
tion fails to agglomerate in the lottery case. I argue that a qualied version of justication
agglomeration is plausible even if justication amounts to no more than epistemic permis-
sibility, and that denying agglomeration in the lottery case creates a dilemma (§3).
2. first objection: obligations to believe lottery propositions
As we have seen, the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox is based on the assump-
tion that a person’s having justication for a belief is to be identied not with this person’s
being obligated or required, but with this person’s being permitted to have this belief.9
This is a tenable view, and I shall grant it for the sake of the argument. As Gilbert
Harman in particular has emphasized, there is no point in cluttering one’s mind with
an abundance of trivial or otherwise uninteresting beliefs, even if we could justiably
have them.10 And as Mark Nelson has argued, a duty to believe every proposition that
our evidence justies would amount to a duty that we could not possibly satisfy, since
our evidence always justies an innite number of possible beliefs.11 Plausibly, then, we
are not obligated to believe everything we are in a position to believe justiably.
However, the truth of this claim does not sufce for the permissibility solution to suc-
ceed. That justication does not necessarily amount to epistemic obligation does not entail
that justication does not give rise to epistemic obligation under certain conditions that a
lottery case might satisfy. And if there are such conditions under which justication gives
rise to epistemic obligation, then the lottery paradox can be restated in terms of such obli-
gations, no matter whether justication as such amounts to permissibility or obligation.
2.1 Bridge principles and the permissibility solution
To illustrate this worry with the permissibility solution, consider:
Bridge pattern: A ought to believe p iff (i) A has justication for believing p, and (ii) condition C
obtains.
in substituting (1) for (1)WS. In my view, he thereby overlooks the central paradox, which consists in the
fact that (1) and (2) entail (3). In a later discussion (Kroedel 2013a: §2), he acknowledges this version of
the paradox and explicitly states that he rejects not only (1)WS but also (2). Ultimately, these are matters
of presentation only. Whether the central paradox is that (3) is entailed by (1) and (2) or that it is
entailed by (1)WS and (2)WS, in either case Kroedel accepts both (1) and (2)WS, while rejecting both
(1)WS and (2), and in either case this commits him to denying justication agglomeration.
9 In this article, I use the terms ‘obligation’, ‘requirement’ and ‘duty’ interchangeably in order to refer to
the epistemic ‘ought’. No moral connotations are intended by the use of any of these terms.
10 See Harman (1986: 12–15).
11 See Nelson (2010: esp. 96–8). Whiting (2012: 292) also makes this point.
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Different views about how condition C needs to be understood for Bridge pattern to come
out as true are possible. Drawing on Gilbert Harman, we may say that C is the condition
that A is interested in whether p is the case.12 Drawing on Robert Nozick, we may say that
C is the condition that A’s expected utility of believing p is higher (or at least not lower)
than the expected utility of having no belief about whether p is the case.13 My own view is
that C is the condition that A pays sufcient attention to the question of whether p is the
case.14 But my aim here is not to defend a particular view about condition C. I mention
these different accounts only to illustrate that there are various ways to avoid the implaus-
ible implications of a view that identies justication with epistemic obligation while still
holding on to the intuitively plausible claim that we are sometimes required, and not
merely permitted, to have epistemically justied beliefs.
Before I will say a bit more in defence of this claim, let me briey explain the problem
that it poses for the permissibility solution. Suppose that one of the mentioned views about
condition C is correct. We may then stipulate a lottery case in which condition C is
satised for every lottery proposition. Imagine, for example, that A considers buying a lot-
tery ticket and can choose any particular ticket. For each ticket, she is interested in the
question whether the ticket will lose, she explicitly asks herself of every lottery proposition
whether it is true, and for each lottery proposition that she considers, it is indeed the case
that the expected utility of believing it is higher than the expected utility of suspending
judgement. Our bridge principle will then entail, together with the probability claim,
that for each lottery proposition, A ought to believe it.15 And since obligations agglomer-
ate (as the proponent of the permissibility solution agrees), and epistemic obligations
imply epistemic justication, we will not be able to avoid the paradoxical conclusion
that A has justication to believe that all tickets will lose unless we give up the conjunction
claim in the wide-scope reading that the permissibility solution aims to preserve as well.
Taking ‘O’ as the operator for epistemic obligation, this argument can be represented
as follows:
(4) OBl1& . . . &OBln
(5) O(Bl1& . . . &Bln), from 4 by obligation agglomeration [(OBp&OBq)O(Bp&Bq)]
(6) J(Bl1& . . . &Bln), from 5 by obligation implies justication [O(Bp)J(Bp)]
(7) JB(l1& . . . &ln), from 6 by wide-scope conjunction claim [J(Bp&Bq)JB(p&q)]
12 Cf. Harman (1986: 55).
13 Cf. Nozick (1993: 86).
14 See Kiesewetter (2017: 180–5). One argument in favour of this latter view is that it makes good sense
of how the assumption that sufcient evidence for p is not by itself enough to ground an obligation to
believe p ts together with Richard Moran’s famous observation that the rst-personal deliberative
question of whether to believe p is transparent on the theoretical question of whether p is the case
(cf. Moran 1988: 143). My account of condition C explains this, because it entails that once one con-
siders this question in deliberation, sufcient evidence for p does sufce for an obligation to believe p.
15 It is no reply to say that since agents like us are psychologically incapable of attending to all lottery
propositions at the same time, there is no time at which A is obligated to have each lottery belief.
Apart from the fact that this reply presupposes an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the atten-
tion condition, it ignores that we may simply stipulate an agent who has this capacity, and that we still
want to deny that such an agent has justication for believing that all tickets will lose.
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A proponent of the permissibility solution thus needs to reject any instance of the bridge
pattern that, together with the probability claim, entails (4).
Kroedel is committed to the existence of epistemic obligations himself: the permissibil-
ity solution maintains that in a lottery case, we are not permitted to believe that all tickets
will lose, which is equivalent to saying that we are obligated not to believe that all tickets
will lose.16 This, however, is a negative epistemic obligation, while the bridge pattern gen-
erates positive epistemic obligations. To escape the problem, Kroedel may thus want to
follow Nelson (to whom he refers in a note), and others such as Daniel Whiting, in deny-
ing the existence of any positive epistemic obligations.17 Let’s call this view epistemic
permissivism.
2.2 Epistemic permissivism
Despite rst appearances, however, epistemic permissivism does not actually support the
permissibility solution. To see this, note that neither Nelson nor Whiting argue that there
is no true instantiation of the bridge pattern. Rather, they argue that a true instantiation of
the bridge pattern must mention non-epistemic considerations in C, and that for this rea-
son, obligations to believe are never really epistemic obligations. As Nelson puts it:
My thesis is that there is nothing we positively ought to believe simply in virtue of our epistemic
circumstances, and nothing that we ‘ought’ to believe at all, except given some further interest,
desire, duty, or such like.18
I disagree with Nelson on two points. For one, as should be clear from what I have said
above, I do not think that condition C must involve a reference to non-epistemic condi-
tions, and I do not think that Nelson’s argument shows anything like that. Nelson argues
that the quality of an agent’s evidence alone never sufces for an obligation to believe, but
it does not follow that such obligations must be conditional on ‘some further interest,
desire, duty, or such like’. The relevant condition may, for example, be that A pays atten-
tion to the relevant proposition, and this is arguably part of A’s ‘epistemic circumstances’.
For another, even if Nelson is right to say that C must involve a non-epistemic condition, it
seems to me that the obligations resulting from the bridge pattern may still legitimately be
called epistemic obligations (or epistemic duties, or epistemic requirements) as long as
those obligations are not in any way based on non-epistemic reasons for belief. Nelson
does not claim that obligations to believe are based on non-epistemic reasons for belief,
however. His view is rather that sufcient epistemic reasons lead to obligations only if
practical background conditions are satised. It seems to me perfectly ne to call such
obligations epistemic obligations nonetheless. By way of an analogy, it seems to me a per-
fectly intelligible and consistent view to maintain that there are prudential requirements to
16 Kroedel is explicit about this; see Kroedel (2012: 58) for the rst of these claims, and Kroedel (2013a:
108) for the second.
17 See Nelson (2010); Whiting (2012: esp. §5). In his original article (Kroedel 2012), Kroedel does not
claim that there are no epistemic obligations, but only that epistemic justication does not amount
to epistemic obligation. In more recent work, however, Kroedel locates his permissibility solution
within ‘the broader project of understanding epistemic norms in terms of permissions’ (Kroedel
2017: 2), which suggests that he accepts epistemic permissivism.
18 Nelson (2010: 92).
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act in accordance with weighty prudential reasons, but only if certain moral background
conditions are satised.
Most importantly, however, even if we accepted that obligations to have beliefs always
have practical background conditions and that they are therefore never epistemic obliga-
tions, this still would not support the permissibility solution. For as long as we maintain
that some instance of the bridge pattern provides obligations to believe – and neither
Nelson nor Whiting deny this – the lottery paradox can be restated in terms of such dox-
astic obligations, no matter whether these are to be called epistemic obligations or not.
For example, suppose that we have some kind of non-epistemic obligation ‘O*’ to
believe a proposition p iff we have epistemic justication to believe p and the truth of p
matters to us. Next, suppose for the sake of the argument that the truth of each lottery
proposition matters to us. We can then restate the lottery paradox in terms of such
non-epistemic obligations:
(8) O*Bl1& . . . &O*Bln
(9) O*(Bl1& . . . &Bln), from 8 by obligation agglomeration
(10) J(Bl1& . . . &Bln), from 9 by obligation implies justication [O*(Bp)J(Bp)]
(11) JB(l1& . . . &ln), from 10 by wide-scope conjunction claim [J(Bp&Bq)JB(p&q)]
2.3 Doxastic permissivism
Proponents of the permissibility solution might try to resist this argument in either of two
ways. In order to reject (8), they might either go further than the epistemic permissivists
and deny that there are any positive doxastic requirements at all, at least when the prob-
ability of the relevant proposition is below 1:
Doxastic permissivism: No matter how carefully we attend to the question of whether p, and no
matter how important that question is from a practical standpoint, as long as the probability of p
is less than 1, we are always permitted (epistemically and otherwise) to refrain from believing p.
Alternatively, they might accept that there are obligations to have beliefs, but deny that
these obligations entail epistemic justication, and thus reject (10). Although it is beyond
the scope of this article to show that these options are ultimately untenable, it is safe to say
that both are very controversial and face serious problems.
Doxastic permissivism seems at odds with our practice of doxastic criticism. We criti-
cize persons not only for believing against their evidence, but at least sometimes also for
not believing in accordance with their evidence. Such criticism presupposes that there are
obligations, and not just permissions, to have beliefs. Just as blame in general involves the
assumption that an agent has failed to conform to a requirement and not merely omitted
to make use of a permission, blame or criticism of doxastic attitudes involves the assump-
tion that the agent has failed to conform to a doxastic requirement, not merely omitted to
make use of a doxastic permission.19
19 Kroedel (2013a: 107–8) accepts that epistemic blameworthiness entails impermissibility and thus a
violation of an epistemic obligation. For an argument to the more general conclusion that a person
is criticizable for omitting to F only if she has decisive reasons, or ought all things considered, to F,
see Kiesewetter (2017: Ch. 2).
the lottery paradox
episteme volume 16–3 247terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.4
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. HU Humboldt Universitat Zu Berlin, on 22 Jul 2020 at 09:09:49, subject to the Cambridge Core
Consider Smith and Jones, two climate scientists who are both tied to political organi-
zations that deny climate change. Both have very strong evidence for climate change, even
though there is a residual probability that the data are misleading. Both are interested in
the question of whether climate change is happening and pay sufcient attention to it.
While Smith believes that climate change is not happening, Jones suspends judgement
on that question and does not form a belief about climate change at all. It seems to me
that Smith and Jones are both rationally criticizable for their doxastic states. Jones does
not escape such criticism merely by suspending judgment.20 This, however, can be so
only if there are obligations not only to abstain from beliefs that are unlikely to be
true, but also to have beliefs that are likely to be true (under certain conditions).21
Note that epistemic permissivists like Nelson and Whiting can accommodate the fact
that Jones’ doxastic state is criticizable precisely because they do not accept doxastic per-
missivism. For example, Whiting holds that “there are cases in which we criticize subjects
for not believing propositions for which they possess sufcient evidence”22, and he
emphasizes that his view “can account for the fact that there are many cases in which,
given other factors, we do think that a subject should . . . believe a proposition given
the evidence”23. Epistemic permissivists only maintain that the relevant obligation is
not a purely epistemic one. But as the argument from (8)–(11) shows, for the lottery para-
dox it is not relevant whether the doxastic obligation is purely epistemic or not, as long as
we assume that it entails epistemic justication.
So could we salvage the permissibility solution by denying that the doxastic obligations
that we presuppose when we criticize Jones entail epistemic justication? Prima facie at
least, the phenomenon of doxastic criticism supports the entailment: it seems that
Jones’ criticizability is undermined if we assume that he lacks epistemic justication for
believing in climate change, and the most natural explanation for this is that the relevant
obligation is undermined in the same way. Nelson and Whiting also do not appeal to obli-
gations to have unjustied beliefs; their epistemic permissivism is supposed to accommo-
date non-epistemic obligations to have justied beliefs, not to have unjustied beliefs.24
Moreover, there are powerful arguments for the view that there cannot be obligations
to have unjustied beliefs. An obligation of this sort seems to presuppose the existence of
non-epistemic reasons for belief, but it has been argued that the existence of such reasons
is ruled out by plausible constraints on the notion of a normative reason, such as the con-
straint that a reason for belief must be capable of being a reason for which one believes, or
20 This also counts against Nozick’s view. We may assume that Jones’ expected utility of suspending
judgement is higher than that of forming a belief about climate change, but he seems rationally criti-
cizable for suspending judgement nonetheless.
21 Some authors deny this on the assumption that one cannot justiably believe p if one knows that one
does not know p (cf. e.g. Littlejohn 2012: 512). I take it, however, that the point I am making about
doxastic criticism also counts against this restrictive assumption. In any case, the response is not avail-
able to the proponent of the permissibility solution, since it is an essential part of this solution to pre-
serve the initially plausible assumption that for each of the tickets, one can justiably believe that it will
not win.
22 Whiting (2012: 292).
23 Whiting (2012: 293).
24 Whiting elsewhere argues for a constraint on reasons that rules out pragmatic reasons for belief (Way
and Whiting 2016: see esp. 227). On the natural assumption that obligations to have unjustied beliefs
presuppose the existence of such reasons, this means that he is committed to denying the existence of
such obligations.
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capable of guring as a premise of (good) reasoning or deliberation.25 Needless to say, not
everyone has been convinced by these arguments,26 and a satisfactory discussion is beyond
the scope of this article. Two points seem worth noting nevertheless. Firstly, a commit-
ment to the existence of obligations to have unjustied beliefs is at least a signicant
and highly controversial commitment. Secondly, it would be quite surprising if the correct
solution to the lottery paradox – a paradox about epistemic justication – would hinge on
the existence of such obligations. So no matter what one thinks about obligations to have
unjustied beliefs, it seems to speak against the permissibility solution that one needs to
assume such obligations in order to avoid the charge of an extreme and implausible
form of permissivism about beliefs. In any case, I shall disregard the possibility of such
obligations in what follows.
2.4 A consistency condition on doxastic obligations?
On behalf of the permissibility solution, it might now be suggested that there may be an
account of the relevant condition C of the bridge pattern that excludes obligations to
believe lottery propositions, while at the same time allowing the existence of obligations
to believe other epistemically justied propositions that are less than absolutely certain.27
It is unclear, however, whether an account of such a condition can be given without intro-
ducing extremely ad hoc assumptions about the content of propositions that we may be
required to believe (such as, for example, the assumption that a belief can be required
only if it is not about a lottery ticket). To see this, let us briey consider some attempts
to provide a condition that rules out lottery propositions on grounds of their relevant
structural features. At rst sight, it might seem that proponents of the permissibility solu-
tion could put forward a view according to which A has an obligation to believe a prop-
osition p that she has justication to believe iff
C1 A attends to p28 and p is consistent with the conjunction of all other propositions that
A justiably believes.
But unless we assume that A has already formed beliefs about lottery propositions (which
is not essential for a lottery case), this does not rule out the assumption that proponents of
the permissibility solution wish to avoid, namely that for each lottery proposition, A is
obligated to believe it. Alternatively, it might be suggested that A has an obligation to
believe a proposition p that she has justication to believe iff
C2 A attends to p and p is consistent with the conjunction of all other propositions that A
has justication to believe.
25 For arguments along these lines, see e.g. Kelly (2002), Kolodny (2005: §3), Part (2011: App. A), Shah
(2006), Way (2016), Way and Whiting (2016).
26 See e.g. Rinard (2015). It is worth noting that Rinard’s general view about the norms of belief cannot
be employed on behalf of the permissibility solution, as I explain below in note 41.
27 These doxastic obligations might either be understood as epistemic obligations (contrary to epistemic
permissivism), or as justication-entailing non-epistemic obligations (consistently with epistemic
permissivism).
28 Some condition like this is still necessary to avoid Harman’s and Nelson’s points discussed above. The
reader is free to replace this part with her favourite theory of how to account for these points.
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Yet since the permissibility solution is committed to the probability claim, and thus the
assumption that for each lottery proposition, A has justication to believe it, and since
A knows how many tickets are involved and that one of them will win, it follows that
the conjunction of all propositions that A has justication to believe is already inconsist-
ent. As a consequence, there cannot be a proposition that is consistent with this conjunc-
tion, and so C2 effectively rules out all positive doxastic obligations.
C2 might be relaxed by saying that A has an obligation to believe a proposition p that
she has justication to believe iff
C3 A attends to p and p is consistent with each proposition q that A has justication to
believe.29
But this condition seems too weak to exclude obligations to have lottery beliefs. Consider
a particular lottery proposition lx. In order for C3 to exclude an obligation to believe lx,
there would need to be a proposition q such that in a lottery case, A has justication to
believe q, and q is inconsistent with lx. But since lx is extremely likely, every proposition
inconsistent with lx is extremely unlikely. And so we should not assume that A has justi-
cation to believe it. To illustrate this point, an example that comes to mind for a propos-
ition that is inconsistent with lx is the conjunction consisting of the proposition that one
ticket will win and all lottery propositions but lx. But since that conjunction is extremely
unlikely, we should not assume that A has justication to believe it. The same will be true
for every other proposition that is inconsistent with lx. For this reason, C3 does not rule
out an obligation to believe lx.
To escape this problem, it seems that proponents of the permissibility solution have to
put forward a stronger condition, according to which A has an obligation to believe a
proposition p that she has justication to believe iff
C4 A attends to p and A has justication to believe p in conjunction with each propos-
ition q that A has justication to believe.30
This condition will indeed exclude requirements to believe lottery propositions. Since A
lacks justication to believe the conjunction of all lottery propositions, there will be
some conjunction of lottery propositions l1& . . . &lmax, such that A lacks justication
29 Alternatively, one might also put forward C3*: A attends to p and p is consistent with every conjunc-
tion of propositions p1& . . . &pn that is such that A can justiably have the belief-set {B(p1), . . . , B
(pn)}. I do not discuss this condition separately because I take it that on Kroedel’s view, C3 and
C3* are coextensional. The reason for this is that according to any plausible view, if A has justication
for believing (p1& . . . &pn), then A has justication for having the belief-set {B(p1), . . ., B(pn)}. This
claim, together with the wide-scope conjunction claim, entails the following set justication principle:
A has justication for having the belief-set {B(p1), . . ., B(pn)} if, and only if, A has justication for
believing (p1& . . . &pn). And on the assumption of this principle, C3* is satised if, and only if,
C3 is satised.
30 Alternatively, one might also put forward C4*: A attends to p and for every belief-set S that A can
justiably have, the set that results from adding the belief that p to S is one that A can also justiably
have. For the reasons mentioned in the preceding note, on Kroedel’s view C4* is satised if, and only
if, C4 is satised.
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to believe the conjunction l1& . . . &lmax+1. And so C4 rules out obligations to believe lot-
tery propositions.
The problem is that C4 rules out all other obligations to believe propositions that are
less than absolutely certain as well. Think of a proposition q such that the probability P(q)
is barely sufcient to render a belief in q justied – any further decrease of P(q) would
mean that q is insufciently likely for justication. Plausibly, for every proposition p
that we have justication to believe, there will be a p-independent proposition q that is
barely sufciently likely among the multitude of propositions that we have justication
to believe (we can easily arrive at such a barely sufciently likely proposition by conjoining
other propositions that are more likely to a conjunction). Now suppose that the probabil-
ity of p is below 1. Provided that p and q are independent, it follows that the probability P
(p&q) is lower than the probability P(q) and thus insufcient for justication. Thus, on
the reasonable assumption that among the propositions that we have justication to
believe is one that is barely sufciently likely, C4 rules out all requirements on beliefs
that are less than absolutely certain.
The upshot of this discussion is that it is far from clear whether a condition can be
found that rules out obligations to have lottery beliefs on grounds of considerations con-
cerning their relevant structural features without ruling out all obligations to have beliefs
that are less than absolutely certain. This should not surprise us. On the most general
level, what generates the lottery paradox is the fact that the probability of a conjunction
of two independent propositions that are less than absolutely certain is generally lower
than the probability of the conjuncts.31 This is a general feature of propositions that
are less than certain: when such propositions are conjoined in a conjunction, probability
gets lost. If one wishes to avoid the implausible conclusion that one can have justication
for believing highly unlikely conjunctions, then one either needs to reject obligations to
have beliefs that are less than certain, or one needs to reject the claim that one always
has justication to believe the conjunction of all propositions that one is individually obli-
gated to believe. That latter claim is, as I have shown above, a commitment of anyone who
accepts the wide-scope conjunction claim.32 It is also a commitment of anyone who
accepts the narrow-scope conjunction claim.33 And so anyone who wishes to preserve
the conjunction claim (in either the narrow- or the wide-scope version) has to deny the
existence of obligations to have beliefs that are less than absolutely certain.
2.5 Summary
Let me briey sum up this section. That justication does not generally amount to epi-
stemic obligation seems plausible, but it does not entail that there are no epistemic obliga-
tions if certain background conditions are satised. If there are such obligations, however,
then the lottery paradox recurs on the assumption that the conditions in question are
31 The same fact is also what generates the structurally very similar paradox of the preface, put forward
by Makinson (1965).
32 For epistemic obligations, this is shown by the argument from (4) to (7). For non-epistemic obligations,
this is shown by the argument from (8) to (11).
33 This is clear from the fact that since epistemic obligation entails epistemic justication, (4) entails (1),
and given the narrow-scope conjunction claim (2), (1) entails (3). The same is true for non-epistemic
obligations that entail epistemic justication: (8) entails (1), which together with (2) entails (3).
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satised, as is shown by the argument from (4) to (7). To avoid this problem, the propon-
ent of the permissibility solution might adopt epistemic permissivism, which denies the
existence of any positive epistemic obligations. However, epistemic permissivism allows
for the existence of non-epistemic obligations to believe epistemically justied propositions
if certain background conditions are satised and is indeed most plausible in combination
with this assumption. As the argument from (8) to (11) shows, the lottery paradox can be
restated in terms of such non-epistemic obligations, unless one adopts the problematic and
highly controversial view that we can be obligated to have unjustied beliefs. Setting this
option aside, the permissibility solution requires a strong form of doxastic permissivism,
which rules out the existence of any positive obligations to have justied beliefs that are
less than absolutely certain. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to demonstrate
that this view is ultimately untenable, I hope to have shown that our practice of doxastic
criticism provides a serious challenge for it. In any case, it seems clearly a contentious
commitment that is in need of further justication.
3. second objection: justification agglomerates in the lottery
case
I have argued that even if justication amounts to no more than epistemic permissibility,
the lottery paradox re-emerges at the level of doxastic obligations unless one adopts an
implausibly permissive view about suspension of belief. In this section, I shall argue
that the permissibility solution fails even if we accept doxastic permissivism. This is
because, as was demonstrated in the introduction, the permissibility solution requires
that in the lottery case, the following principle fails to apply:
Justication agglomeration: If A has justication for believing p, and A has justication for believ-
ing q, then A has justication for believing p and believing q.
I shall argue that no matter whether justication amounts to permissibility or obligation,
justication agglomerates in the lottery case.
3.1 Preliminaries
Let me begin with a logical point. Kroedel’s argument against justication agglomeration
is that justication is a species of permissibility and permissions do not agglomerate.
Kroedel is right to say that permissions do not generally agglomerate. His example illus-
trates this point well: one may be permitted to eat this piece of the cake and permitted to
eat that piece of the cake without being permitted to eat both of these pieces. This shows
that practical permissions do not agglomerate, and, moreover, that it is not a logical or
conceptual truth that permissions agglomerate. What it does not show, however, is that
epistemic permissions do not agglomerate, or that they do not agglomerate in the lottery
case. For even if it is not a conceptual truth that permissions agglomerate, and not a sub-
stantial normative truth that practical permissions agglomerate, it may still be a substan-
tial normative truth that epistemic permissions agglomerate, or that they agglomerate
under conditions that the lottery case satises. Thus, one cannot conclude from the fact
that practical permissions fail to agglomerate that epistemic permissions fail to
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agglomerate as well, or that they fail to agglomerate in the lottery case. This conclusion
requires additional assumptions about the norms of belief.
This logical point gives rise to a problem for the permissibility solution, for once we
address the relevant normative question directly, it seems actually quite plausible to
think that epistemic permissions do indeed agglomerate. An agent has epistemic justica-
tion to believe p just in case she has sufcient evidence for believing p.34 Justication
agglomeration thus seems to amount to no more than the claim that we are always epis-
temically permitted to have all those beliefs together for which we have sufcient evidence.
Considered as such, this principle seems at least prima facie plausible, and the proponent
of the permissibility solution owes us an argument for why it should be rejected.
As it happens, there is indeed a good argument against accepting justication agglom-
eration without qualication. Suppose that George has sufcient justication for believing
p. Next, suppose that George could not be bothered whether p is the case and therefore
does not form a belief about whether p (he also is quite sure that he will not do so). It
seems that in such a case, George has justication for believing p, but George also has jus-
tication for believing that he himself does not believe that p. Justication agglomeration
yields the result that George has justication for [believing p and believing that he himself
does not believe that p]. However, it looks like having these two beliefs together is indeed
not epistemically permissible, and so justication fails to agglomerate in this case.35
It is not difcult to identify the reason why agglomeration fails in George’s case. The
problem is that the actual formation of a belief in p would change his evidencewith regard
to the proposition that he does not believe that p, thereby undermining the justication he
has for believing this proposition.36 As the actual formation of one belief undermines the
justication for the other, George cannot justiably hold both of these beliefs at the same
time. But surely this is an exceptional case. Typically, the formation of a justied belief
does not itself undermine the justication one has for other beliefs, and in such typical
cases, agglomeration still seems plausible. Hence, George’s case does not cast doubt on
the following qualied agglomeration principle:
Justication agglomeration (qualied): If A has justication for believing p, and A has justication
for believing q, and adopting one of these beliefs does not undermine the justication for the other,
then A has justication for believing p and believing q.
Since the formation of a belief in one lottery proposition does not undermine (or even
affect) the justication we have for believing any other particular lottery proposition,
this qualied agglomeration principle applies to the lottery case.
34 Recall that we are concerned with epistemic justication only. By ‘sufcient evidence’ I mean ‘evidence
sufcient for providing justication for a belief’. What I say here is compatible with radical views
according to which evidence is sufcient only if it guarantees truth.
35 Compare Heylen (2016) and Rosenkranz (2016, 2017), who discuss similar cases as counterexamples
to the conjunction claim.
36 Could one not have justication for believing that one does not believe p, despite the fact that one
believes p? I do not wish to deny that this is possible. But in a case in which one has justication
for believing that one lacks a belief in p despite believing p, it is difcult to see what is wrong with
saying that one might also have justication for (believing p and believing that one lacks a belief in
p). Hence, such a case does not provide a counterexample to the unqualied version of justication
agglomeration.
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Proponents of the permissibility solution might argue that the lottery paradox itself
provides reasons to question this principle. That is, they might argue from the probability
claim and the wide-scope conjunction claim to denying the qualied agglomeration prin-
ciple.37 But as long as there is no independent reason to question this principle, it is
unclear why the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox is in any way preferable
to the classical solution of Kyburg and others. While the classical solution rejects the con-
junction claim in both the standard interpretation and the wide-scope interpretation, the
permissibility solution rejects the conjunction claim in the standard interpretation and the
qualied agglomeration principle. Both of these views then come at the cost of denying
principles with prima facie plausibility, and it is difcult to see how considerations con-
cerning lottery cases themselves could be able to show why the permissibility solution
has any advantage over the classical solution, given that the same cases can also be
used to motivate the classical solution.
3.2 Denying justication agglomeration creates a dilemma
I have argued that the proponent of the permissibility solution owes us an argument for
rejecting the plausible assumption that as long as the formation of a justied belief does
not undermine the justication for another belief, justication agglomerates. I shall now
provide a positive argument for the qualied agglomeration principle. The argument is
that denying this principle creates a dilemma. If one denies the qualied agglomeration
principle, then one is committed to the following possibility: While forming a number
of justied beliefs, a person reaches the point where she is no longer justied in having
all these beliefs together, even though each individual belief remains justied. Since she
is not justied, she is not permitted to have these beliefs, and since she is not permitted,
she is obligated not to have them. So anyone who rejects the qualied agglomeration prin-
ciple is committed to the existence of epistemic obligations not to have certain sets of
beliefs that are such that each belief is individually justied. But how are we to satisfy
such an obligation? I shall argue that those who reject the qualied agglomeration prin-
ciple face a dilemma here. On the rst horn of this dilemma, they maintain that it can
be fully rational to revise a belief on the basis of the very same evidence on the basis of
which one formed the belief in a fully rational way. On the second horn, they accept
that there is no rational way to satisfy that epistemic obligation.
Let us consider the lottery case as an example for an alleged agglomeration failure.
Proponents of the permissibility solution hold that we have justication for believing
each lottery proposition l1, . . ., and ln, but we do not have justication for having all of
these beliefs together. So if a person forms lottery beliefs, starting from B(l1), she will at
some point acquire a lottery belief B(lmax), such that if she adds a further lottery belief
B(lmax+1) to her set of lottery beliefs, she is no longer justied in having these beliefs
together.38 Now consider the case of Lotta. Lotta acquires individually justied lottery
beliefs, and nally arrives at the belief-set {B(l1), . . ., B(lmax+1)} that, according to the
37 This is, in effect, the argument against justication agglomeration that Kroedel submits in a later paper
(Kroedel 2013b: 452–3).
38 See also the exchange between Littlejohn (2012, 2013) and Kroedel (2013a, 2013b), esp. Kroedel
(2013a: §3). Further below, I assume on behalf of Kroedel that max+1 is reached exactly when the
conjunction of l1, and . . ., and lmax+1 is too unlikely to be justiably believed. But this is not an essential
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permissibility solution, she is not justied in having. Since Lotta is not justied, and thus
not permitted, to have this set of beliefs, she is obligated not to have it. But how is she
going to satisfy this obligation?
In order to satisfy the obligation not to have the belief-set {B(l1), . . ., B(lmax+1)}, Lotta
needs to revise at least one of her lottery beliefs. But how is she going to do this in a
rational way? Plausibly, we can rationally form and revise a belief only on the basis of
“object-given” (or “content-related”) rather than “state-given” (or “attitude-related”) rea-
sons.39 Object-given reasons for and against beliefs are provided by facts that bear on the
truth of the object or the content of the relevant belief, while state-given reasons (if there
are any such reasons) are provided by facts concerning the state of having or lacking a
belief, for example by considerations concerning the benets of having or lacking a belief.
As already mentioned above, many philosophers maintain that all reasons for doxastic
attitudes (or even all reasons for attitudes) are object-given: they hold that pragmatic
considerations can provide reasons for wanting to have certain beliefs, or reasons for
actions that have causal effects on beliefs, but not reasons for belief.40 But even those
who insist on the existence of pragmatic reasons for belief often accept that they are ir-
relevant for the rationality of belief (or, if one thinks that this is different, for the epistemic
rationality of belief).41 It is a widely accepted point that insofar as processes of
belief-formation are epistemically rational, they are guided by evidential considerations
(in the broad sense of considerations that bear on the truth of the content of the relevant
assumption of my argument – as far as this argument is concerned, max+1 might already be reached
when the person acquires the belief that l2.
39 See Part (2001: §2) for the object-given/state-given distinction and Piller (2006) for the
content-related/attitude-related distinction. The distinction is related (many would say identical) to
the distinction between so-called “reasons of the right kind” and “reasons of the wrong kind”; see
Gertken and Kiesewetter (2017) for a recent survey of the literature.
40 See e.g. Gibbard (1990: 37), Kolodny (2005: §3), Shah (2006), Skorupski (2007), Part (2011: App.
A), and Way (2012).
41 Compare Schroeder (2012: 459), a prominent proponent of the view that pragmatic considerations,
such as those provided by Pascal’s wager, provide reasons for belief: “being aware of Pascal’s reasons
– even if you grant the success of his argument – does not make belief in God more rational qua belief.
. . . So there seems to be a distinctive dimension of rational assessment of beliefs . . . that is affected by
the epistemic reasons of which the subject is aware but not the pragmatic reasons of which the subject
is aware.” Foley (1987: 214), another prominent proponent of pragmatism, holds that “all things con-
sidered, it can be rational for an individual to believe what is not epistemically rational for him to
believe”. As Foley grants that the epistemic rationality of belief-formation is not affected by pragmatic
reasons for belief, this is ne for the argument of this section, as long as we hold on to the plausible
assumption that it must be possible for us to satisfy epistemic obligations in an epistemically rational
way. Rinard (2017), yet another proponent of pragmatism, goes so far as to deny that there is any
dimension of the rationality of belief that is insensitive to pragmatic considerations: “every belief-state
is univocally either rational or not” (128) and “believing against the evidence can be perfectly
rational” (122). However, her denial seems motivated by a general scepticism about epistemic
norms, according to which normative notions such as ‘justication’, ‘permissibility’ or ‘obligation’
are univocally applied to beliefs as well as to actions, and the same standards that apply to the justi-
cation, permissibility or obligatoriness of action also apply to the justication, permissibility or obli-
gatoriness of beliefs (cf. Rinard 2017: 124). This view is fundamentally at odds with Kroedel’s
approach, which presupposes the existence of epistemic justication, epistemic permissions and (nega-
tive) epistemic obligations – it thus cannot be employed on behalf of the permissibility solution. In par-
ticular, Rinard’s view is incompatible with the probability claim, according to which high evidential
probability provides justication for beliefs, which the permissibility solution is designed to preserve.
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belief).42 Moreover, what seems plausible for rational process of belief-formation seems
equally plausible for processes of belief-revision; these processes, too, must be guided
by evidential considerations in order to be epistemically rational.43 Finally, in order for
a body of evidential considerations to rationalize the formation or revision of a belief,
this body must contain sufcient epistemic reasons for forming or revising this belief:
insufcient epistemic reasons for a belief do not rationalize its formation, and insufcient
epistemic reasons for revising a belief do not rationalize its revision.44 Thus, in what fol-
lows I will assume that one can rationally revise a belief only on the basis of evidence that
provides sufcient object-given reasons for revising this belief.
This assumption poses a problem for the permissibility solution. Let tmax be the point in
time when Lotta has acquired the belief set {B(l1), . . ., B(lmax)}, and tmax+1 the point in time
when she has acquired the belief-set {B(l1), . . ., B(lmax+1)}. According to the permissibility
solution, Lotta is required to give up a lottery belief at tmax+1, but not at tmax. Her evi-
dence, however, does not change between tmax and tmax+1 – all that changes is that
Lotta adopts one further lottery belief.45 But Lotta cannot rationally revise one of her lot-
tery beliefs on the basis of the consideration that she already has too many other lottery
beliefs. Considerations concerning the lottery beliefs that Lotta has adopted have nothing
to do with the content of any of her lottery beliefs; if such considerations provided reasons
for or against lottery beliefs, those reasons would be state-given rather than object-given
reasons.
Proponents of the permissibility solution face a dilemma at this point. Either they main-
tain that Lotta’s evidence provides sufcient object-given reasons for revising one particu-
lar lottery belief, or they accept that this is not the case. On the rst horn, they are
committed to the perplexing claim that a body of evidence that indicates that a propos-
ition p is extremely likely provides sufcient reason for revising a belief in p. This is doubly
implausible. For one, because it is in itself implausible to assume that evidence indicating
that there is an extremely small chance that a belief is false provides sufcient reasons to
42 See esp. Kelly (2002).
43 Note that this is compatible with the assumption that we can rationally suspend judgment on whether
p on the basis of non-epistemic reasons, e.g. on the basis of the reason that one is tired or distracted.
Schroeder (2012: §2) puts forward similar cases in order to show that there can be state-given reasons
against beliefs (and other attitudes). I agree with those who think that such reasons are better under-
stood as reasons against performing certain actions, such as the action of making up one’s mind about
p, rather than as reasons against the doxastic state of believing p (see e.g. Shah and Silverstein 2013).
Regardless of this question, however, such cases do not cast doubt on my assumption that we can
rationally revise a belief that we already have only on the basis of object-given reasons. It seems
clear that one cannot rationally revise a belief for the reason that one is distracted, for example.
(One may rationally revise a belief in p on the basis of the consideration that one has formed the belief
under epistemically questionable circumstances such as distraction, but only if one thinks that this
casts doubt on the assumption that the evidence that one took oneself to have for p was sufcient.
Again, this is not an example of a rational belief revision on the basis of reasons that have nothing
to do with the truth of p.)
44 This is not to say that it is easy to determine when a body of evidence is sufcient. Here I merely point
out that a piece of evidence might support p without providing sufcient epistemic reasons to believe p
or to revise a belief in ¬p.
45 Note that this is exactly where Lotta’s case differs from George’s case discussed above. When George
forms both the belief that p and the belief that he does not believe that p, his evidence has changed, and
he can give up one of his beliefs on the basis of sufcient object-given reasons. That is why the argu-
ment presented here supports only the qualied agglomeration principle.
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revise that belief. For another, because it is implausible to assume that the very same body of
evidence can provide sufcient reasons for both forming and revising the same belief, and
proponents of the permissibility solution are already committed to saying that Lotta’s evi-
dence provides sufcient object-given reasons for each lottery belief. Thus, accepting the
rst horn of the dilemma commits them to denying the following plausible principle:
Asymmetry principle: If some body of evidence provides a sufcient basis for rationally forming
the belief that p, then the same body of evidence does not provide a sufcient basis for rationally
revising the belief that p.
On the second horn of the dilemma, proponents of the permissibility solution accept that
Lotta lacks sufcient object-given reasons for revising any of her particular lottery beliefs.
Given that one can rationally revise a particular belief only on the basis of sufcient
object-given reasons for revising this belief, this means that there is no rational way for
Lotta to satisfy her epistemic obligation. Accordingly, Lotta can satisfy her obligation
only through some irrational process such as wishful thinking or reasoning on the basis
of insufcient reasons or some non-rational process such as forgetting. I take it, however,
that the absence of an epistemically rational process by which one can satisfy an epistemic
obligation undermines the claim that such an obligation exists to begin with. Even though
the epistemic ‘ought’ does not imply voluntary control over doxastic states,46 it surely
implies some sort of ‘can’ that goes beyond the possibility of irrational or accidental con-
formity. In any case, it should be clear that a commitment to epistemic obligations that
cannot rationally be satised would be a signicant cost of the permissibility solution.
The problem generalizes for everyone who denies the qualied agglomeration principle.
If justication fails to agglomerate in a case in which the formation of a belief does not
undermine the justication for the other, then it is possible that a number of beliefs are
individually but not collectively justied. This means that a person who has formed
these beliefs is under an epistemic obligation to give up one of her individually justied
beliefs. And this creates a dilemma: either we have to assume that it can be fully rational
to revise a belief on the same evidence on which it was rational to form that very belief, or
we have to accept that there are epistemic obligations that cannot rationally be satised.
Better, then, to stick with the qualied agglomeration principle.
3.3 Objections
In the remainder of this section, I shall discuss two objections to the argument I have
given. The rst objection is that the rst horn of the dilemma can be accepted, because
the asymmetry principle is independently questionable. For one, it may be argued that
there are borderline cases in which the evidence probabilizes a proposition to a degree
such that one can rationally form as well as revise a belief in that proposition on the
basis of that evidence. For another, phenomena that are being discussed under the heading
pragmatic encroachment seem to show that the standards for knowledge and justication
can depend on the pragmatic context,47 and it seems to follow from this that it can be
rational to revise a belief in p on the basis of the same body of evidence on the basis of
46 Cf. Chuard and Southwood (2009).
47 See e.g. Fantl and McGrath (2002).
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which one has rationally formed it. To give just one example, it may be argued that it can
be rational to revise a belief that the time is such-and-such, which one has rationally
formed on the basis of testimonial evidence, if one has learned in the meantime that some-
one’s life depends on what time it is now, even though the evidence itself has not changed.
I am not convinced that considerations like these really defeat the asymmetry principle,
but this question lies beyond the scope of this paper. I shall instead argue that the dilemma
for the permissibility solution remains in place even if we grant both of these points. First of
all, let me emphasize that the violation of the asymmetry principle is only one part of the rst
horn of the dilemma. Even if the asymmetry principle turns out to be false, the point remains
that it is independently implausible to assume that a body of evidence that indicates that a
proposition is extremely likely provides sufcient reasons for revising this belief.
That proponents of the permissibility solution are committed to this assumption (on
the rst horn of the dilemma) also shows that it does not help them to accept borderline
cases as counterexamples to the asymmetry principle. They have to maintain symmetry of
rational belief formation and revision not only in borderline cases but in all cases in which
the probability is less than 1. What this means is that for all propositions that we have
justication to believe, but which are less than absolutely certain (and this will be the
vast majority of propositions we have justication to believe), we have sufcient reasons
for both forming and revising belief in that proposition; we can continuously go back and
forth in forming and revising all such beliefs while remaining fully epistemically rational.
This goes far beyond accepting that there may be borderline cases in which the asymmetry
principle fails to apply.
Finally, it also does not help the permissibility solution to reject the asymmetry prin-
ciple on grounds of considerations concerning pragmatic encroachment. This is for the
simple reason that the relevant phenomena do not call into question that there is an asym-
metry between forming and revising beliefs within one and the same pragmatic context.
And we can simply stipulate that no change of pragmatic context occurs in Lotta’s case.
The second objection takes issue with my claim that rejecting the rst horn of the
dilemma (and thus accepting that there is no sufcient object-given reason for revising
any particular lottery belief) commits one to the existence of an epistemic obligation
that cannot rationally be satised. The proponent of this objection holds that in order
to rationally satisfy an obligation not to have the combination of beliefs [B(l1), and . . .,
and B(lmax+1)], one does not need sufcient object-given reasons for revising any particular
lottery belief, one only needs sufcient object-given reasons for revising [B(l1), or . . ., or B
(lmax+1)]. Since the conjunction of l1& . . . &lmax+1 is, ex hypothesi, insufciently likely,
Lotta’s evidence may plausibly be taken to provide sufcient object-given reasons for
revising [B(l1), or . . ., or B(lmax+1)]. And so, the objection continues, Lotta can rationally
satisfy her obligation even though she lacks sufcient object-given reason for revising any
particular lottery belief.
My response is that in order to revise a particular belief in a rational way, we need suf-
cient object-given reasons to revise this particular belief. Evidence that shows a conjunc-
tion of propositions to be insufciently likely provides a sufcient basis for rationally
revising a belief in this conjunction, but it does not by itself provide a sufcient basis
for rationally revising a belief in one of the conjuncts. Note that our evidence quite gen-
erally suggests that the conjunction of all of our beliefs is unlikely or even inconsistent –
yet this is no reason on the basis of which we can rationally revise one of our particular
beliefs.
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This response may be challenged by way of an analogy to the practical case. You have
promised to give me one out of a set of n presents, all of which you like equally well.
This is a reason to give me [present1, or . . ., or presentn]. Even though it is not a reason
to give me one particular present rather than another, you can rationally pick one particular
present on the basis of that reason. Why then should it not be rationally possible for us to
revise a particular lottery belief on the basis of a reason to revise [B(l1), or . . ., or B(lmax+1)]?
I take it that the two cases are not intuitively on a par. Intuitively, one can rationally
pick one of the presents, but one cannot rationally “pick” one of the beliefs. Rational
belief revision is not a matter of picking. This intuitive difference is also reected in the
fact that the most natural explanation of why it is possible for us to rationally decide
to give away one particular present does not likewise suggest that it is possible for us to
rationally revise one particular lottery belief. The explanation in the practical case is
that we have instrumental reasons to take means to actions we have reason to perform
and that we can rationally base a decision to take a particular means on such instrumental
reasons, provided that these reasons are sufcient and that there is no conclusive reason
against taking the particular means. If you have sufcient reason to keep your promise,
then you also have sufcient reason to take sufcient means to keeping your promise,
and since you have no conclusive reason against giving away present1, and doing so is
a sufcient means to keeping your promise, you can rationally base a decision to give
away present1 on this reason.48
However, as Jonathan Way has argued convincingly, such principles of instrumental
transmission of reasons generally do not apply to object-given reasons for attitudes.49
For example, if you have sufcient object-given reasons to revise your belief that God
exists, and a necessary or sufcient means for you to doing this is revising your belief
that life is meaningful, it does not follow that you have any object-given reason to revise
that latter belief – and so it does not follow that you can rationally revise it on the basis of
the original object-given reason. More generally speaking, rational belief-formation and
-revision is not sensitive to instrumental considerations in the way that rational decision-
making is. Therefore, the analogy to the practical case fails. Even if we were to assume
such a thing as an object-given reason to revise [B(l1), or . . ., or B(lmax+1)], it would not
follow from this that there is an object-given reason, and thus a rational basis, for revising
any of your particular lottery beliefs.
4. conclusion
According to the permissibility solution, the lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic jus-
tication is identied with epistemic permissibility. Kroedel maintains that such an account
of justication would allow us to reject the agglomeration of justied beliefs, and thus to
maintain both the probability claim and a version of the conjunction claim, without being
committed to the paradoxical conclusion that we have justication for believing that all tick-
ets will lose. I have presented two objections to this solution. First, even if justication
amounts to no more than permissibility, there plausibly are obligations to believe what is
48 For discussion of such instrumental reasons, see e.g. Gertken and Kiesewetter (Ms), Kiesewetter
(2015), Bedke (2017), Kolodny (Forthcoming).
49 See Way (2010: §4), and esp. Way (2012).
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very likely to be true given certain background conditions, and the lottery paradox can be
restated in terms of such obligations. Second, even if there are no obligations to believe lot-
tery propositions, the permissibility solution fails because, apart from exceptional cases in
which the formation of a justied belief undermines the justication for another belief, jus-
tication agglomerates. Both of these objections show, on independent grounds, that a sat-
isfying solution to the lottery paradox, which accepts the probability claim, needs to reject
the conjunction claim in either of the versions distinguished above.50
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